

NPIC/D-305-75

16 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

Hanks

- Some thoughts about your recommendations to the DCI on crisis management:

1. One approach the DCI could take to the direction in which Defense is moving would be to:

a. Endorse the Defense/DIA efforts to develop a more efficient and effective crisis management system within the Defense Department.

b. State his requirement that there be a free flow of timely information among crisis management centers in CIA, State, Defense, NSA and NPIC during a crisis situation.

c. Charge the Intelligence Community Staff to work with Defense, CIA, State, NSA and NPIC to ensure that the appropriate equipments and procedures exist or are introduced to achieve the timely exchange of intelligence and relevant operational information. (I realize that much work already has been done to that purpose by the ICS. The DCI could cite same.)

2. The DCI's response to Hall could stop there or proceed to other aspects. I favor the approach that you outline in your 15 September draft.

3. I attach comments by me on some basic aspects of crisis management.



JOHN J. HICKS

Director

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Attachment:

Crisis Management - Some Basic Aspects

Crisis Management - Some Basic Aspects


1. We have learned some basic lessons in the course of coping with crisis situations over the past 25 years. One is that no two crisis situations are alike. Each one has differed from the others in timing, duration, those involved and their interests and capabilities at the time, the areas and places of importance in the situation, the relative importance of political, military and economic factors and sources of information concerning same, and the character, interests, behavior and needs of the principal American leaders in each situation. The verity that no two are alike has been influential in frustrating previous schemes and attempts to develop a standard system for coping with crisis situations -- and rightly so. The lesson learned is that we should maintain flexible capabilities to meet each crisis situation with arrangements suited to that situation.

2. Another of the basic lessons learned, however, does hold true in most crisis situations. We have learned that we get most fouled up if one or the other intelligence agency is not sharing all of its information relevant to the situation with the other collectors and producers of intelligence in a timely fashion. Conversely we all do better when relevant reports and analyses are "broadcast" promptly to the crisis management centers at all collecting, processing and producing components. This lesson learned tells us that we must have the communications equipment in place and procedures established for achieving this free flow of information in whatever arrangements are selected.

3. A third basic lesson is that special situations require special staffing. We provide our most responsive and best coordinated intelligence in a crisis situation when we gather together in one place in each agency a task force of persons who have expertise related to the various factors of importance in that situation and, usually, distribute them around the clock to give 24 hour coverage. One might conclude from this lesson that we should combine all the relevant expert intelligence officers from the various intelligence agencies in a single location in the Washington area to handle a crisis situation. Not so for two reasons. First, each intelligence agency needs its own task force in a crisis situation to provide it with information peculiar to its own or its department's operational and information collection responsibilities and capabilities relevant to the situation, and to provide information and

advice peculiar to the needs of the principal leaders served by the agency. Second, the persons assigned to task force work need ready access to -- and to be critiqued by -- the nearby bodies of research and technical expertise in each agency which are not caught up in the hourly and daily analysis and production work but have relevant knowledge and perspective on the geography, forces, personalities, etc. involved in the situation.

4. Another lesson, recently learned, is that our response to the needs of the White House in a crisis situation becomes more effective and efficient when a single point of responsibility is designated for managing that responsiveness. I point to the experience in which the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East was so assigned by the DCI to ensure effective support to the White House and Secretary Kissinger during the last Middle East crisis and subsequent developments in that area. We have not had a great deal of experience with this technique, but we have had a great deal of experience operating without it. Throughout my share of those latter experiences I have repeatedly felt and seen the need for such a full-time focal point of responsibility for a given situation of crisis management. In my observations the efforts of the various intelligence agencies in such situations have suffered from the lack of a dedicated managerial focal point.



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